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Abstract 
The widespread subcontracting arrangements in the engineering industry 
in Pakistan are examined from the perspective of both 'vendor' and 'parent' 
firms. The nature of the contract is presented and reasons for subcontracting 
are explored including credit arrangements and technological innovation 
facilitated by the contract. Cost and price mark-ups in subcontracting and 
methods of contract enforcement such as various 'tying' arrangements are 
reviewed. It is concluded that subcontracting results in process rather than 
product specialization to achieve division of labour and thus enables small and 
large firms to coexist in the industry. 
1. Introduction 
Subcontracting as a form of industrial organization is widespread in 
the engineering industry in Pakistan. In agricultural machinery manufacturing, 
which is an important component of Pakistan's engineering sector, the incidence 
of subcontracting is striking and was noted in the course of a field 
survey undertaken to study that sector (Nabi, 1984a). This follow-up study is 
an attempt to present a detailed discussion of the nature of 
its importance in beginning industrialization. The study is based on a survey 
of parent (firms that subcontract work out) and vendor firms (who subcontract 
work in, also known as ancilliary firms in the literature) conducted in the 
Punjab province of Pakistan in spring 1984. 
Historically, subcontracting has been important in economic 
development. In Japan, in 1966, about 310,000 enterprises (53.6 percent of all 
medium and small enterprises in manufacturing) were subcontractors and they 
employed 3.6 mill~on workers or more than one quarter of the total 
manufacturing labour force (Watanabe 1971). Subcontracting has also been 
important in industrialized countries such as the U.S., France and Sweden. In 
the U.S., as recently as the 1960's, primary government contractors were 
legally required to contract out work to small subcontractors (Small Business 
Administration, 1969). In France subcontractors' cooperatives were active in 
the early 1960's in devising schemes to help small entrepreneurs to overcome 
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problems of the prevailing recession (Levy, 1964). The success of Swedish 
Association of Metalworking Industries contributed to promoting subcontracting 
in all four Nordic countries (Sverges Mekanforbund, 1967). More recent examples 
of successful subcontracting are Taiwan and South Korea. In Pakistan the 
beginning of automotive industry in cities like Karachi and Lahore has resulted 
in rapid growth of subcontracting. 
asSubcontracting takes place in commercial construction well as in 
wemanufacturing activities. In this discussion, are concerned with 
subcontracting in manufacturing. We focus on situations where a large parent 
firm contracts out part of the production process to small vendor firms with 
notboth contributing importantly to the final product. The parent firm does 
merely purchase ready made parts and components from vendor firms but actually 
has a contract, formal or informal, with the vendor firm regarding quality of 
work and the schedules of delivery. Such subcontracting enables us to examine 
the generally held view (elaborated in Hamid and Nabi, 1984) that small and 
large scale production arrangements are competing strategies in economic 
development. Our discussion will show that, on the contrary, subcontracting 
reflects important complimentarities between small and large scale 
manufacturing. This suggests a special role for subcontracting in development 
strategies. 
Our examination of subcontracting arrangements allows us to focus on 
several important economic issues. One is, what determines the decision of the 
firm regarding the number of processes it integrates to produce the final 
product? This is related to the question of process specialization which will 
be taken up· in our discussion. Another issue concerns inter-sectoral linkages 
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in the economy. The usual argument is that for balanced growth a development 
strategy that forges and exploits linkages between agricultural and 
sectors of the economy is to be preferred to one that does not foster such 
interlinkages (one important reason being that linkages allow maximum 
multiplier effects of investment and consumption). Subcontracting arrangements 
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that we examine in this study forge intra-sectoral linkages and 
importantly in realizing balanced growth. For subcontracting to exploit such 
linkages successfully, communications between parent and vendor firms and 
firm location is important and will be examined in this study. 
Recent discussions of tenancy in agriculture have emphasized that 
because of market imperfections landlord-tenant relationship often extends 
credit and product markets in addition to the land market. Such market 
interlinkages affect tenant behaviour and influence the outcome of policies 
aimed at increasing agricultural productivity. We find that in subcontracting 
arrangements, parent firms often extend credit and technological know-how to 
vendor firms. We examine how such inter-linkages in subcontracting are likely 
to influence pricing decisions and the spread of technological innovation. 
The study is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the 
sample of parent and vendor firms that were interviewed to obtain information 
on subcontracting. In section 3 we examine the following issues in detail: 
(i) Nature of the contract 
(ii) Reasons for subcontracting. 
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(iii) Communications between vendor and parent firms. 
(iv) Subcontracting and the credit market. 
(v) Technological innovation in subcontracting, 
(vi) 'Tying' in subcontracting. 
(vii) Costs and price mark up 1n subcontracting, 
(viii) Contract enforcement. 
In section 4 some economic implications of subcontracting are 
discussed and some policy issues considered. 
Section 2 
We examine the issues enmnerated in section 1 using two sets of data. 
First we r~port the extent of subcontracting in the agricultural machinery 
industry on the basis of data collected in the field survey conducted in the 
spring of 1982 for a major study of the industry (the survey is described in 
Nabi 1984a). The evidence as to which processes and components are 
subcontracted is also taken from that survey. The evidence on details of the 
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contract was collected in a subsequent survey conducted in spring 1984. In 
section we briefly describe this survey. Firms were selected in Lahore, 
Gujranwala, Faisalabad and Sheikhupura districts, the three districts of 
Pakistan's Punjab where subcontracting is common. 
The widespread incidence of subcontracting in Faisalabad and Lahore 
corresponds well with the experience in other countries. Both cities have a 
sizeable industrial base (these being two of the most industrialized cities in 
the country). The skilled labour force is large because of the presence of 
substantial engineering industry such as textile machinery manufacturing and 
household durables (gas cooking ranges, water heaters, washing machines, fans 
and water coolers) apart from agricultural machinery. Many of the 
subcontracting firms have been started by skilled workers in the engineering 
industry who have managed to save or borrow capital to start their own 
operations. 
In the main field survey conducted in 1982, 54 firms had reported that.· 
they subcontract out processes and components (ie. they are parent firms) while/ 
40 had reported that they subcontract components in (i.e. they are vendor 
firms). In the follow-up survey we interviewed all 40 vendor firms and 31 of 
the parent firms. Thus we hope to discuss the subcontracting arrangements from 
the twin perspective of parent and vendor firms. 
The citywise distribution of parent and vendor firms is given in table 
1 below: 
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Table 1: Citywise Distribution of Subcontracting Firms in the Sample. 
Cities Vendor Firms Parent Firms Total 
Lahore 11 10 21 
Sheikhupura 8 8 16 
Gujranwala 2 2 4 
Faisalabd 19 11 30 
Total 40 31 71 
The firms in Sheikhupura are in that district for administrative 
reasons. They are located on Sheikhupura road on the outskirts of Lahore so 
that really the firms are part of Lahore's light engineering industry. In 
Gujranwala we interviewed 4 subcontracting firms. These represent only the 
agriculture machinery industry. Gujranwala is an important centre of the light 
engineering sector in Pakistan and subcontracting in this sector is common. We 
encountered several firms that subcontract work from large Lahore firms 
manufacturing household durables. We did not include these firms in the sample. 
Section 3.1: Subcontracting firms and the processes subcontracted. 
The main field survey revealed that 104 firms (out of the 119 
interviewed) manufacturing agricultural machinery are involved in 
subcontracting. Fifty-four of these are pure parent firms while 40 are pure 
vendor firms. Ten firms reported that they both subcontract in as well as 
subcontract out, in other words they are parent-cum-vendor firms. In table 2 we 
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present evidence on variables that indicate the relative size of the firms 
involved in subcontracting and their key technical ratios. 
Table 2·, Mean Values of Economic Accounting Variables of Subcontracting Firms.'.: 
Parent Firms Vendor Firms Parent-cum-Vendors 
Value Added 4,39,300 1,55,363 2,98,500 
Value of Machinery 2,46,613 96,765 1,06,314 
Value of 'Sophisti-
cated' Machinery to 
Total Machinery 0~295 0.444 0.381 
Total Labour 21.42 5.43 11.69 
Skilled/Total Labours 0.31 0.52 0.41 
Value Added/Labour 20,508 28,612 '25,535 
Value Added/Capital 1.78 1.605 2.807 
Capital/labour 11,513 17,820 9,094 
Notes: a: 
b: The total value of machinery owned by the firm evaluated at 1982. 
prices. For details see Nabi (1984b). 
It can be seen that vendor firms are smaller compared to parent firms 
while the parent-cum-vendor firms fall between the two. Also, vendor firms are 
more capital and skill intensive compared to parent firms. 
In table 3 we report the processes and components subcontracted by the 







Table 3: Processes/Components Subcontracted by Parent Firms 
Tubewel l Firms Thresher Firms 
38Total firms subcontracting 16 
Subcontracted Activity 
Casting 14 11 
Sheet metal cutting 0 23 
Machining 8 12 
Complete components 12 14 
Painting 4 6 
Tubewell firms in our sample sell the package of diesel engines and 
pumps. The most important processes for these firms are casting and machining. 
Casting is a specialized skill and most firms do not undertake it then.selves. 
Firms may choose to specialize in the manufacture of pump sets or diesel 
engines in which case the other component is subcontracted. Twelve of the 16 
tubewell firms report subcontracting either diesel engine or pump sets. There 
is no sheet metal cutting activity in the tubewell industry. On the other hand, 
for threshers this is the most important process requiring specialized 
equipment and most firms subcontract out this process. The component most 
frequently subcontracted out is the thresher fan. 
In the sections that follow we examine subcontracting arrangements 
more closely using evidence collected in the second field survey. 
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Section 3.2 Nature of the Contract.· 
The.interviews reveal that none of the vendor firms produce for a 
single parent firm. Most vendor firms subcontract from 3 or more parent firms. 
However, 70 percent of the vendors in our sample responded that one parent 
dominates others in the sense that between 60-70 percent of the output is 
manufactured for a single parent firm. In sections 3.6 and 3.9 we examine how 
this influences negotiations regarding technical innovation and prices. 
The contract between vendor and parent firms is arrived at by direct 
negotiations. Only one vendor firm, located in Faisalabad, reported 
subcontracted work from a firm which,- in turn, had subcontracted from a parent 
firm. This, however, is the only vendor firm out of the 29 interviewed in 
Faisalabad that reported this so that we cannot generalize regarding the tier 
trend in subcontracting relationship even in a city that has a large 
engineering industry base. Also none of the vendor firms reported 
subcontracting work to secondary vendor firms. Further, only 2 firms (1 in 
Lahore out of 10 interviewed and 1 in Sheikhupura out of 8 interviewed) 
reported that they had obtained the contract through c01IDD.ission agents. Thus 
the classic putting out system in which the commission agent plays an important 
role does not appear to be at work in the subcontracting arrangements in 
agricultural machinery industry of Pakistan. 
The parent firms usually have more than one subcontractor. This is 
partly because more than one component of the machines is subcontracted. The 
other reason is that firms prefer to subcontract the same component to more 
10 
than one vendor to ensure bargaining strength rega
rding price mark-up over 
costs. The citywise breakdown of 31 parent firms i
n our sample along with 
number of their vendors is reported in table 4. 
Table 4: Breakdown of Parent Firms by Number of Vendors and
 by City. 
4 5 6 TotalCity 1 2 3 
5 1 1 1 10Lahore 2 
2 1 8Sheikhupura 2 2 1 
2
Gujranwala 1 1 
11
Faisalabad 3 6 2 
1 4 2 31Total 7 8 9 
The number of components subcontracted by parent f
irms is reported in table 5. 
Table 5: Number of Components Subcontract
ed by Parent Firms by City 
6 Total3 4 5City 1 2 
2 10
Lahore 1 1 3 
3 
2 1 2 3 8Sheikhupura 
21 1
Gujranwala 
1 2 11 7Faisalabad 1 2 5 
10 7 7 31Total 2 5 
Table 5 read in conjunction with table 4 reveals a
n interesting 
picture. It appears that parent firms subcontract 
more than one component to 
T 
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one vendor firm. Also they subcontract more than one vendor for the same 
component. There seems to be little pricing advantage in subcontracting 
different components to the same vendor firm. This arrangement is undertaken 
circumstances when the parent firm is very large compared to the vendor firm 
· and when vendor firms have diverse engineering skills. Thus this practice is 
most widespread in Lahore and its outskirts (Sheikhupura firms) where access 
firms with diverse engineering skills located in Lahore is easy. 
The importance of subcontracting in agricultural machinery 
manufacturing can be gauged by examining the proportion of the value of 
subcontracted by the parent firm. This is reported in table 6. 
Table 6: Value of Output Subcontracted Out by Parent Firms. 
City ½; 10% 10-19% 20-29% 30-39% 40-49% 50-59% 60-80% Total 
Lahore 1 1 2 2 3 1 10 
Sheikhupura 1 2 1 2 2 8 
Gujranwala 1 1 2 
Faisalabad 2 1 1 2 1 4 11 
Total 4 3 2 5 6 5 6 31 
More than half the firms in our sample subcontract out between 
40-80 percent of the gross value of the output they produce. Thus 
subcontracting arrangements constitute a significant proportion of the 
manufacturing activity in the industry. 
12 
Earlier we stated that most vendor firms negotiate directly with 
parent firms without intermediaries. This is confirmed by parent firms. Only 1 
out of 31 firms interviewed reported secondary subcontracting. The parent firm 
involved here is located in Sheikhupura and manufactures relatively 
sophisticated agricultural machinery such as mechanical reapers which lends 
itself to secondary subcontracting because of the large number of components 
involved •. 
Our survey reveals some interesting features regarding the Choice of 
vendor firms by parent firms. Only one parent firm reported that it invites 
bids by vendors before awarding the contract. The remaining 30 firms choose 
their vendors through references and through personal knowledge of the vendor 
firm. Further insights into the selection procedure were obtained by asking the 
vendor firms how they obtained the contract. Their answers are reproduced in 
table 7 below: 
Table 7: Breakdown of Vendor Firms by Method of Approaching Parent Firms. 
City A B C Total 
Lahore 5 3 11 
Sheikhupura 5 2 1 8 
Gujranwala 1 1 2 
Faisalabad 7 11 1 19 
Total 16 19 5 40 
A:owner of vendor firm previously employed by parent firm. 
B:Owner of vendor firm previously employed by a firm manufacturing machines 
similar to parent firm machines. 
C: Vendor firm owner's relative employed in the parent firm. 
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Sixteen out of 40 vendor firms (40 percent) reported that they had 
obtained the contract from the parent firm because the owner was previously 
em.ployed in the parent firm. Nineteen vendor firms (48 percent) reported that 
they bad previously been employed by firms manufacturing machinery similar to ,' 
that being manufactured by the parent firm and thus had the necessary expertise 
to manufacture the components. The parent firms were aware of this. Only 5 
firms reported that they had obtained the contract through relatives who 
for the parent firms. It is interesting that 'nepotism' is unimportant in an 
industry dominated by a single (lobar) 'bradri'. The relative importance of 
personal contacts in awarding contracts, compared to bidding, as revealed by 
both vendor as well as parent firms, may be important at this early phase of 
subcontracting. As the practice becomes more widespread and the machinery 
manufactured becomes more sophisticated requiring specialized and standardized 
engineering skills, parent firms are more likely to adopt formal bidding 
procedures. This is likely to happen also because with greater standardization 
risk associated with the manufacturing process undertaken by the vendor firms 
is likely to decline. 
Typically, vendor firms are small firms both regarding labour employed 
(10 workers or less) as well as value of machinery owned and are considerably 
smaller than parent firms (see section 3.1). There are some exceptions to this. 
Two parent firms in Sheikhupura and Lahore reported that vendor firms were 
larger than they were both in terms of workers employed as well as value of 
machinery. The vendor firms in these two cases are large, diversified, 
engineering firms of Lahore that perform specialized tasks for firms in the 
engineering sector. 
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section 3.3 Why Subcontract? 
There are several reasons why subcontracting may come to exist. As we 
have seen, agricultural machinery manufacturing is a good example of an 
industry where the production cycle is not continuous. Components can be 
manufactured separately and then assembled together in the final stage. The 
parent firm that assembles the components to produce agricultural machinery 
(assuming responsibility for its performance to the buyer) may choose to 
subcontract for the following reasons: 
(i) To save capital, i.e. it may not wish to purchase machinery that 
requires specialized operations if these operations use up only a part of the 
machine capacity. Under these circumstances it may be beneficial to subcontract 
these operations to firms that specialize in that activity and perform similar 
operations for other engineering firms. 
(ii) To save labour particularly in terms of the specialized skills 
that are required to perform operations such as those discussed above. Again it 
may be feasible for a vendor firm to specialize in such operations given that 
it can perform these operations for other firms in the engineering industry. 
(iii) To take advantage of lower wages for similar tasks prevailing 
amongst vendor firms because vendor firms rely on family labour and the labour 
market may be characterized by a dual wage structure (family labour is paid 
lower wages compared to labour hired in the market). 
(iv) To avoid problems of labour management. Vendor firms specializing 
in a few operations under the close supervision of the mechanic/owner may 
realize greater effort from workers who, in any case, may be related to each 
other and thus may work in a congenial environment which may contribute to 
higher productivity. 
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(v) To save capital costs of structures and other overheads. Vendor 
firms may have lower overhead costs because they are located in owners' 
dwellings. Subcontracting may thus lead to better utilization of resources 
tied up in such dwellings and underemployed family labour. 
(vi) As a buffer against business fluctuations. When business is 
parent firms can pass on the effects to vendor firms rather than bear all the 
costs of excess capacity. This is socially desirable in view of the fact that 
vendor firms take orders from many firms.manufacturing different types of 
machinery so that loss of orders from one section of the industry does not 
result in severe financial burden to the vendor firm. 
In the survey we interviewed parent firms to elicit the importance 
these reasons for subcontracting. In table 8 we reproduce their responses. 
Table 8: Frequency of the Stated Reasons for Subcontracting by Parent firms. 
City A B C D E F 
Lahore 10 10 10 7 2 3 
Sheikhupura 8 8 6 8 1 2 
Gujranwala 2 2 2 
Faisalabad 11 10 8 7 4 2 
Total 31 30 24 24 7 7 
Notes: A: To save capital (machinery) D: To avoid labour problems. 
B: To save labour E: To save capital {structures). 
C: Lower wage advantage F: Buffer against business fluctuations 
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The most frequently stated reason for subcontracting is saving on 
capital followed by saving on labour. Taking advantage of lower wages in vendor 
firms and avoiding labour problems tie for the third important stated reason. 
Saving on costs of structures is not frequently stated as an important reason. 
This is surprising given that many firms are obviously short of space. 
Machinery, raw material and semifinished components clutter the shop floor. 
Thus it would make sense if components are subcontracted for this reason also. 
However, agricultural machinery manufacturing is seasonal so that for several 
months in the year shop floor space appears to be adequate. Thus it may not 
always be perceived as a binding constraint. Only 7 firms stated that 
subcontracting is important as a buffer against business fluctuation. Several 
of the firms who stated this reason cited the seasonality factor in the 
business and were aware that overheads are reduced as a result of 
subcontracting. It is worth noting also that agricultural machinery 
manufacturing (excluding diesel engines) is going through a period of high 
growth associated with the early phases of farm mechanization. Expectations 
regarding growth in the future are high so that, as yet, there is a lack of 
awareness that this can also be an important reason for subcontracting. 
The household character of vendor firms is confirmed in our survey. 
Except for 2 firms with diverse engineering skills, firms have 10 or less 
workers most of whom are related to firm owners. Several of the apprentices we 
interviewed said that they are willing to work for.less wages in their 
relative's firm compared to what they would accept in another firm because 
there is no 'nokar-hakim' (servant-boss) relationship in the relative's firm. 
Also they expected to get better training in the relative's firm. In another 
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firm they would would be asked to do mostly unskilled work, better skills 
reserved for their own kith and kin. Thus it appears that dual labour market. 
features associated with the nature of firm organization may be at work and ( 
this facilitates subcontracting. 
Section 3.4: Location of Firms. 
For successful subcontracting firm lo.cation is important. Firms 
located in Lahore and Faisalabad subcontract a larger proportion of their 
components compared to other firms. The reason, of course, is that vendor 
are more likely to locate themselves in towns with a large and diverse 
industrial base. The large industrial base facilitates specialization and thus ; 
allows subcontracting. All the parent firms we interviewed responded that 
vendor firms were within 2 mile radius (18 firms had their vendors within 1 
mile radius). Distance is important, specially in the early phases of the 
subcontracting relationship, since close supervision of the vendor firm 
operations may be necessary to ensure that specifications are met. Although 
the parent firms we interviewed had telephone connections, only 9 reported that 
they were connected by telephone to their vendor firms. Thus personal visits 
are essential. In any case, we were informed that such visits are extremely 
important for direct discussions on specifications since drawings and written 
instructions concerning engineering specifications are almost never used. 
these circumstances physical examination of the components and visual 
impressions is what counts. For all these reasons it is important to be located 
near vendor firms. 
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In Lahore many of the vendor firms are located in Sarai Sultan which 
is adjacent to the market for scrap and pig iron. These constitute the major 
raw material and a substantial proportion of the total cost of production of 
vendor firms. The material is bulky and has high transportation costs. These 
costs are lowered by locating the firm near the source of supply. Another 
attraction of this location is the feeling of being in the market and having 
easy access to information regarding demand for their product, sources of raw 
material supply and technological innovation. Also there is considerble 
informal exchange of machine time and engineering advice. This location 
specificity of vendor firms and the need for close supervision makes parent 
firms location specific as well. This may explain the concentration of light 
engineering industry in Pakistan in cities like Lahore, Faisalabad, 
Gujranwala, and Sialkot. 
3.5 Subcontracting and the credit market. 
We have already seen (Nabi,1984b) that the credit markets serving the 
light engineering sector are far from perfect. Basically, there are four broad 
sources of credit. These are: government sponsored credit institutions such as 
development banks and cooperatives that subsidize credit resorting to rationing 
to clear the excess demand; commercial banks that charge the government fixed 
lending rate plus a service charge - they also resort to rationing; back street 
capital markets that charge the market clearing interest rates but borrowers 
have a high probability of default; and finally, friends/relatives and self-
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generated funds. We discussed how each of these arrangements work and how 
influence investment decisions and choice of technology. Another borrowing -~ 
arrangement that we discussed was suppliers' credit and advances on machine 
orders. In subcontracting it is this last arrangement that is most commonly .. 
observed. We recorded many instances where parent firms extend loans to vendor 
both for working capital and for purchasing fixed assets such as machinery. In 
this section we present the evidence on vendor-parent firm relationship in 
credit market. 
Our present discussion focuses on issues that have much in common 
recent developments in the economics of agriculture in developing countries. Iri. 
that literature it is argued that landlord-tenant relations are complex in that 
they interact in credit, product, land and labour markets simultaneously. This< 
market interlocking arises from imperfections in markets for inputs and output:-:. 
For example, a household may find it difficult to get credit or sell family 
labour, so it rents land from a landowner who often also supplies credit. 
Another example is that of the rural town middleman who ties up credit 
availability with sale of the crop. We shall see in this section and those 
follow that similar interlocking may exist in the parent-vendor firm 
relationship as well. 
In table 9 we present the response of vendor firms to our questions 
about their most important sources for financing fixed investment (where fixed 
investment mainly covers additions to capital stock through purchase of 
machinery). 
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Table 9: Most Important Sources For Financing 
Fixed Investments Of Vendor 
Firms: 
D E F TotalCity A B C 
2 1 11Lahore 1 4 3 
Sheikhupura 3 3 2 
8 
Gujranwala 1 1 2 
1 7 4 2 1 4 19Faialabad 
1 8 40Total 2 14 11 4 
Notes: A: Parent Firms B:Friends/relatives C: Self-generated funds 
D: Commercial Banks E: Government credit banks F: Informal
 street 
markets. 
Only 2 of the 40 firms we interviewed reported that parent fir
ms are 
the most important source for financing fixed investment. In m
ost cases such 
investment is undertaken by borrowing from friends/relatives 
and through 
self-generated funds. Interestingly, informal street capital m
arkets are as 
important as parent firms for financing fixed investment. Thi
s shows that such 
markets may work well in that they enable relatively long term
 borrowing •
, 
Unfortunately, we did 
. 
not get reliable information on terms of borrowing in 
these markets. From our experience in the main field survey w
e know that real 
interest rates can be as high as 30 percent per annum which is
 more than twice 
the commercial bank rate. Formal credit institutions such as 
commercial banks 
and specialized government credit institutions are relatively
 unimportant in 
financing the purchase of capital stock. This is consistent w
ith our earlier 
findings reported in Nabi (1984b). 
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In section 3 .3 we stated that an important reason for subcontracting.· 
is that parent firms can save on capital. Thus it is hardly surprising that 
they do not lend to vendor firms to finance the purchase of machinery. 
would tie up their capital precisely in the manner which they attempt to avoid.
., 
through subcontracting. Owners of 2 vendor firms that had been 
their parent firms were unhappy about the arrangements whereby parent firms 
only expect to jump the delivery queue but also dictate the choice of other 
parent firms particularly when rivals are involved. One of the vendors felt 
that his owner always "drags him down" when his business is bad by not 
him to seek out other customers. This sounds implausible since the parent 
financier can always share the returns with vendors by al lowing them to take 
orders from others. 
The parent firm is an important financier of working capital. This 
be seen in table 10 where parent firms are listed as the most important source 
of borrowing by a majority of vendor firms. 
Table 10: Most Important Sources of Working Capital of Vendor Firms. 
City A B C D E F Total 
Lahore 6 2 2 1 11 
Sheikhupura 5 2 1 8 
Gujranwala 1 1 2 
Faisalabad 7 4 3 1 4 19 
Total 19 9 6 1 5 40 
Note: See table 7 for definition. 
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Nearly half the vendor firms interviewed reported that the most 
important source of borrowing is the parent firm. Three vendors, 1 in Lahore 
and 2 in Faisalabad, reported that parent firms arrange direct supplies of raw 
material needed to manufacture the components. Most vendors felt that it was 
best to have own resources (this includes friends and relatives) but if 
borrowing is essential, they prefer to borrow from parent firms since their 
terms are best. Such borrowing does not involve the payment of interest. Also,­
demand is less uncertain since parent firms are committed to buying. The 
advantage to parent firms of such lending is that it enables them to work 
closely with vendor firms to improve the quality of subcontracted components 
and to ensure that delivery schedules are met. In the next section we shal 1 say
 
more on this when we examine the technological relationship between parent an
d 
vendor firms. 
3.6 Subcontracting and Technology: 
Accounts of the Japanese subcontracting experience, and the more 
recent studies of subcontracting in Taiwan and Korea, suggest that this 
industrial organization has played an important role in technological 
innovation. Broadly speaking, the process of technological innovation can be 
thought to consist of three important dimensions. One is the perceived need fo
r 
the innovation which may depend on the relative prices of capital and labor an
d 
expectations regarding returns to the innovation. Another (or the second) is 
the nature of engineering skills required for innovating and whether these are
 
easily accessible. The third is whether capital markets function well and 
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enable the financing of innovation. Clearly, risks are associated with all 
three dimensions and together they may have a compound effect on the riskiness 
of the innovation. Subcontracting arrangements may encourage technological 
innovation by allowing innovating parent firms to share the risk with vendor 
firms by sharing their working capital. We have already seen that many parent 
firms lend working capital to vendor firms. At least in the case of one large 
parent firm (Millat tractors, to be discussed in section 4, which is a leading 
innovating firm) we know that its vendors are able to raise working capital 
with its assistance. In return for this assistance, which implies a subsidy by 
the parent firm, vendors undertake to manufacture the new components. 
In the previous section we saw that 19 vendor firms reported that 
parent firms are the most important source for working capital. We also asked 
these firms about the number of innovated components they had manufactured for 
parent firms in the previous three years.The responses are recorded in table 
11. 
Table 11: Number of Innovated Components Manufactured by Vendors In the 
Previous Three Years By whether or Not Parent Firms Lend Working Capital 
Total Vendors None One Two Three Four or More 
Parent Firm 19 5 3 4 4 3 
Lends 
Parent Firm 11 6 4 1 
Does Not Lend 
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It can be seen in the table that vendor firms that have borrowing 
arrangements with parent firms carry out innovations more frequently compared 
to vendors that do not have such arrangements. We now examine the technological 
relationship between subcontracting firms and comment on the method by which 
parent firms encourage vendor firms to innovate. 
Component design. 
Technical drawings are almost never used by parent firms to explain 
the component design to vendor firms. The usual practice is to hand over the 
prototype, which may be imported or designed by a rival firm, to the vendor 
requiring little modification. While the component is being manufactured for 
the first time the parent firm actively supervises the process to ensure that 
specifications are met. This usually requires frequent visits by the skilled 
machinists of parent firms. Once the newly manufactured component is deemed 
satisfactory, such visits become rare. 
Material and equipment selection. 
There is active involvement of the parent firm regarding material 
selection throughout the parent-vendor firm relationship since the quality of 
material, as much as vendor craftmanship, determines the life and quality of 
the component. Although parent firms rarely get directly involved in equipment 
selection by vendors, they investigate thoroughly the equipment available with 
vendors before awarding the contract. Vendors having a wide range of machining 
equipment have a greater chance of being selected. For vendor firms that cast 
components, the range of dies and furnaces is important. 
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Skills training. 
We observed only one parent firm which has an active program of 
training vendor firm workers in skills required to manufacture new components. 
This firm, Millat Tractors, is exceptional and not really representative of the 
industry. The firm is an important component of the publicly owned Automobile 
Corporation of Pakistan. Until 1972, when it was nationalised, it imported 
Massey-Ferguson tractors in knocked-down condition and assembled them in its 
plant in Lahore. It had a capacity of assembling two to three thousand tractors 
every year. In 1980 it began a program of progressive domestic manufacturing. 
Starting with 19 percent, it increased the domestically produced components to 
27 percent in 1981, 38 percent in 1982 and 55 percent in 1983. This involved 
160 components in 1980 and had gone up to 410 in 1983. The firm has a large 
section which deals with vendors with departments specializing in component 
design, marketing and supervision. It organizes frequent conferences of 
to resolve engineering and financial problems. This firm is not included in 
sample of 40 parent firms being discussed in this section. 
Vendor firm grouping. 
Although all the vendor firms we interviewed expressed a keen interest, 
in formal trade groupings to exchange information on new methods and skills, as .·· 
yet no such grouping exists formally. Informal exchanges, as mentioned earlier, 
are common but they do not always work. Some firm owners complained bitterly of• 
severe competition and the associated secrecy "even among people who belong to 
the same lobar bradri". 
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Section 3.7 'Tying' in Subcontracting: 
In our discussion of the relationship between parent and vendor firms
we saw that parent firms provide both credit for working capital as well as
technological advice to vendor firms. We shall now examine whether this
relationship results in the vendor firm getting 'tied' to the parent firm in
the sense that it is unable to perform similar tasks for other firms in the
industry. If such tying is widespread, it is likely to effect the vendor firms'
ability to use its capital stock (machinery) intensively and thus one of the
benefits of subcontracting mentioned in section 3.3 will be lost. 
In Table 12 we report parent-vendor firm tying arrangements. Only 9 
Table 12: Vendor Firm Tying Arrangements. 
Cit A B C D 
Lahore 11 3 2 1 1 
Sheikhupura 8 2 1 1 
Gujranwala 2 
Faisalabad 19 4 3 3 
Total 40 9 6 5 1 
Notes: A: Total Number of Firms. B: Number of Vendor Firms reporting tying. 
C: Number of firms reporting tying only when new process introduced.
D: Duration of tying: 1 year, 2 years, 3 years. 
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vendors out of the 40 we interviewed reported tying. Tying is a verbal 
by the vendor firm to the parent firm that, for a specified period, it will 
perform similar work for another firm. Of the 9 firms reporting tying, 6 
responded that tying takes place only when the parent firm introduces, or 
actively participates, in the development of a new component. In most cases 
such tying is only for one production season when the parent firm introduces 
the new component. Patents are non-existent in the industry so that rival firms 
can, and often do, enter the market the following year by copying the models 
developed by one firm. Thus the 'free rider' problem exists and may inhibit 
technological innovation in the industry. Further evidence of the free rider 
problem is indicated by the response by both parent as well as vendor firms 
that it is hard to police such tying and that if the price is right, vendor 
firms are quite likely to make the innovated component avilable to rival firms •. 
However, it appears that such "copying" of innovations has at least one year 
lag. Few parent firms expect the innovation to be kept hidden from rivals for 
more than one year. This, to some extent, may explain why only small, gradual, 
:\: 
modifications are made in the designs of agricultural machinery. The other side/ 
of such loose tying arrangments is that vendor firms are relatively free of 
production constraints of one parent firm and thus they can avoid excess 
capacity in their capital stock when business is bad for one parent firm. 
Section 3.8 Costs and Price Mark-up in Subcontracting. 
We have argued that an important advantage of subcontracting is that 
parent firms can avoid access capacity in the off-peak season (and the 
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organizational costs of obtaining and fulfilling contracts) and thereby achieve 
lower costs of production compared to what they would be in the absence of 
subcontracting. This requires a careful analysis to determine whether, in fact, 
the cost of producing similar components under subcontracting arrangements are 
different compared to the firm undertaking production of all components 
itself. To carry out such an analysis, detailed data on costs of vendor firms, 
including imputed value of equipment time used in the production process, 
should be collected and compared with similar cost data for firms that 
manufacture their own components. Such comparisons, in themselves, will not be 
sufficient to establish the superiority or otherwise of own production over 
subcontracting. There may be important externalities of undertaking the entire 
production process by the parent firm which the previously outlined analysis 
ignores. For example, parent firms' skilled workers and supervisory labour may 
become thinly spread causing inefficiencies. Also, the shop floor may become 
cluttered and congested, seriously hampering the work flow and contributing to 
costs. All these reasons would also make subcontracting attractive. 
We do not have detailed data needed to examine the cost advantage of 
subcontracting as discussed above. We do, however, have information on pricing 
decisions in subcontracting. A discussion of this information will indicate the 
relative bargaining strengths of parent and vendor firms in arriving at 
contracted component prices and will shed some light on the decision to 
subcontract. 
In table 13 we report firms' responses to our questions regarding 
their perception of the adequacy of prices they receive or pay for the 
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subcontracted components. After discussions with firms, we defined prices 
adequate if they were 15-20 percent above the cost of manufacturing 
too high if they were 20-30 percent above costs and too low if they were 10-15 , 
percent above costs. Thirty out of the 40 firms we interviewed replied that 
prices paid by parent firms are adequate while 10 felt that prices are too low. 
On the other hand, 18 parent firms out of 31 interviewed thought that prices 
they paid are adequate while 13 thought prices are too high. Thus more vendor 
firms (75 percent) believe that prices are adequate compared to parent firms 
(58 percent). We interpret this to imply that vendor firms are more frequently 
satisfied with subcontracted component prices compared to parent firms who may 
feel that they are driven to this arrangement by the high organizational costs 
of undertaking production themselves. 
Table 13: Price-Cost Perceptions of Parent and Vendor Firms. 
A B C Total Firms 
Vendor Firms 30 (75%) 10 (25%) 40 
Parent Firms 13 (42%) 18 (58%) 31 
Notes: A: Prices too high (20-30%) above costs. B: Prices adequate (15-20% 
above costs) C: Prices too low (10-15% above costs). 
Table 14: Price Perceptions of Parent Firms Compared to Own Manufacture and 
Vendor Firms Compared To Market Prices. 
Higher The Same Lower Tot al Firms 
Vendor Firms 4 (10%) 24 (60%) 12 (30%) 40 
Parent Firms 4 (13%) 18 (58%) 9 (29%) 31 
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An alternative view of pricing 1n subcontracting is presented in Table 
14, Here we record the response of vendor firms to our question: Are the prices 
you receive for the subcontracted components higher, the same or lower than 
what you would receive without subcontracting (transacting in the iromongers' 
market)? The corresponding question to the parent firm was: Are the prices you 
pay for subcontracting components higher, the same, or lower than the imputed 
value of components had you manufactured then yourself? A majority (70 percent) 
of vendor firms reported that subcontracting prices are either adequate or 
higher while a majority (87%) of parent firms believed that subcontracting 
prices are the same or lower. The vendors reporting that prices are lower under 
subcontracting are, in most cases, those that have 'tying' relationship with 
parent firms. As we saw in section 3.7, such tying is not very widespread. The 
conclusion that we draw from this evidence is that, by and large, vendor and 
parent firms are better off under subcontracting since both feel that they can 
do no better under alternative arrangements. 
Section 3.9. Contract Enforcement. 
The success of subcontracting for the parent firm lies in ensuring 
that product specifications and delivery schedules are met by vendor firms, 
This is determined, in part, by the material and moral incentives for 
fulfilling contracts, such as goodwill in the industry, prompt payment on 
delivery and advance payments on orders. Equally important are the penalties 
associated with nonfulfillment. In this regard we attempted to examine the 









parent firm (Millat Tractors, discussed in 3.6) that had anything 
written contract with vendors. Even this was quite informal. The 'contract' 
a letter from the parent firm indicating the number of components to be 
supplied. There was nothing on delivery schedules and component 
Verbal contracts, of course, exist and are taken very seriously 
in a small business, goodwill and reputation are very important. Besides, as w 
have seen earlier, vendor and parent firms belong to the same 'lobar' bradri. 
This is also important in contract fulfillment. Informal escape clauses exist 
and come into effect when circumstances leading to contract non-fulfillment 
obvious, such as illness or death or bottlenecks in the supply of essential 
material. When this happens, no legal machinery is activated. The 
knows of the circumstances, since personal supervision ensures close contact 
with vendor firms, and makes appropriate arrangements depending on whether 
not it believes that the vendor did not willfully break the contract. Only 2 
parent firms in our sample reported breach of the verbal contract. The 
firms had absconded with advance payments on components. In both cases vendor 
firms were new to the locality. 
Delays in delivery of components were reported frequently but there 
were no reported penalties associated with such delays - except the threat that 
no work would be subcontracted in the following season. This threat is rarely 
carried out since the average duration of the contract with vendors is 
5 and 8 years. It is worth noting, however, that parent firms that lend credit 
and provide technical know-how to their vendors are more likely to succeed in 
contract enforcement compared to others. We grouped firms according to whether 
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they provided such assistance and report their responses regarding contrac.t 
fulfillment in table 15. 
Table 15: Contract Fulfillment for Parent Firms Providing Assistance 
A B C D E 
( i) ( ii) ( i) (ii) ( i) ( ii) (iii) 
.Assisting Firms 13 10 3 11 2 2 7 4 
Other Parent s 18 12 6 13 5 2 5 10 3 
Notes: A: Number of Firms. B: Delivery Schedules ( i) satisfactory, (ii) 
unsatisfactory. C: Specification Schedules (i) satisfactory (ii) 
unsatisfactory. D: Average contract duration (i) 1-5 years (ii) 5-8 years (iii) 
8 years or more. 
The vendor firm story of subcontracting is relatively more 
straightforward. We came across no cases where a contract was broken 
prematurely. The main issue, from vendor perspective, is payment schedules of 
parent firms. Vendor firms reporting tying arrangements are, in general, more 
satisfied than others regarding payment schedules. In Faisalabad 2 vendors 
reported that they had stopped working for parent firms because of exceptional 
delays ( 6 months in one case and 4 months in the other) in payments on 
delivered components. 
Unrecognized (by the government) 'federations' of agricultural 
machinery manufacturers exist in all towns that we visited. ·Membership is open 
to both vendor and parent firms. However, separate groupings of vendor firms do 
not exist. All the vendors we interviewed expressed a keen desire to form such 
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groups to exchange technical information and for financial cooperation. A 
common perception is that such groups can ensure better working 
parent firms particularly with regards to parent firms' payment schedules. 
vendors were unanimous that this is one area where the government ought to 
intervene and pro100te such groups. 
Section 4: Some Economic Implications of Subcontracting. 
Earlier studies of Agricultural machinery in Pakistan, by Falcon 
(1967) and Child and Kenada (1975), report that large and small firms coexist• 
producing a homogenous product. This view of the industry implies that there 
are no. scale related barriers to entry. The existence of widespread 
subcontracting arrangements that we have observed suggest, however, that 
is process (or component) specialization rather than product homogegeity 
industry. This is consistent with Adam Smith's view that with expansion in the, 
size of the market, process specialization (division of labour), foliows. In a 
growing agricultural machinery industry, which does not require a continuous 
production process, large firms find it attractive to subcontract processes 
components) to small firms. 
Subcontracting is also implied in the classic paper by Coase (1937) 
the nature of the firm. He examines the factors that discourage firms from 
vertically integrating until the entire production process is carried out under 
one organization. In the context of our discussion, when the net benefits of 
contracting in additional services to carry out production under one firm 
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organization become negative, subcontracting takes place. Thus we agree with 
Aftab and Rahim 0983) that process specialization, which subc6ntr.acting 
enables, is a more satisfactory explanation for the coexistence of small and 
large firms in the industry compared to the alternative explanation that scale 
economies do not exist as suggested by Child and Kenada. 
In our discussion of subcontracting arrangements we have focussed on 
the interlinkages, and complimentarities that exist between the small vendor 
firms and the large parent firms. These inter-linkages operate primarily in the 
credit market and in the exchange of technical know-how. The main 
complimentarity, of course, is in terms of process or skill specialization. All 
of these are important but in many ways the most important is _that for.ge4 in 
the credit market. It is quite certain that many of the vendor firms would be 
unable to continue operations, given that the credit market functions so 
poporly, without the credit arrangements with their parent firms. The advantage 
to parent firms, of course, is that it enables them to contract out processes -
thus saving labour, capital and organizational costs - to firms that they can 
supervise closely and thus ensure that contract specifications and deli~ery 
schedules are met. This is important in the absence of a formal legal machinery 
for enforcing contracts. Tlrus sub-contracting arrangements suggest that both 
small and large firms co-exist in the industrialization strategies of 
developing countries. Seen in this light the debate that sees the emergence of 
small and large firms as competing strategies for industrialization ignores 
important dimensions of the underlying issues. 
The inter-linkages in subcontracting arrangements imply that parent 
and vendor firms must be located within easily reachable distance of each 
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other. Historically, vendor firms in the engineering industry were located
supplies of raw material to avoid the transportaion costs of the bulky
material. This resulted in the concentration of such firms in specific 
locations to exchange engineering skills and information on prices of input
sources of demand for their output. Parent firms that wish to subcontract must
therefore, seek out firms thus located. This explains the continued growth
small, specialized industrial towns like Daska and Mianchannu in Pakistan. 
One adverse effect of complimentarities between vendor and parent
firms is that they may result in 'tying' and thus may inhibit the diffusion
innovations. There are at least three ways in which a carefully devised
government policy may help here. One is to introduce, and vigo.rously police,
patent system. The other is to make more capital available to vendors from
sources other than parent firms to avoid the creation of monopolies. Thirdly,
programs can be initiated that encourage R & D by selected vendor firms
financial and technical assistance. This should be followed up with frequent
conventions of parent and vendor firms to exchange innovated processes (this
was common in Japanese subcontracting in the first half of this century). 
As we have argued, subcontracting forges important intra-sectoral
linkages, thus enabling maximum multiplier effects of demand and investment
expansion. For this to happen it is important that expansion in demand takes
place for goods which the domestic engineering skills are capable of 
manufacturing. Thus an import policy that makes combine harvestors cheaply
available domestically will result in much of the domestic engineering 
industry, and the'subcontracting links that it forges, being by-passed. 
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Finally, the benefits of subcontracting Im.1st not be the only 
consideration in promoting import-substitution. Thus the success in promoting 
subcontracting by Pakistan Automobile Corporation in the manufacture of cars, 
trucks and tractors must not be allowed to detract from a careful analysis of 
international competitiveness of the import-substituted vehicles. Watanabe 
(1974) has catalogued in detail the economic losses to the society of such 
'forced' subcontracting in India. 
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